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Abstract—We propose a data-driven framework for optimiz-
ing privacy-preserving data release mechanisms to attain the
information-theoretically optimal tradeoff between minimizing
distortion of useful data and concealing specific sensitive in-
formation. Our approach employs adversarially-trained neural
networks to implement randomized mechanisms and to perform
a variational approximation of mutual information privacy. We
validate our Privacy-Preserving Adversarial Networks (PPAN)
framework via proof-of-concept experiments on discrete and
continuous synthetic data, as well as the MNIST handwritten
digits dataset. For synthetic data, our model-agnostic PPAN
approach achieves tradeoff points very close to the optimal
tradeoffs that are analytically-derived from model knowledge.
In experiments with the MNIST data, we visually demonstrate
a learned tradeoff between minimizing the pixel-level distortion
versus concealing the written digit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our work addresses the problem of privacy-preserving data
release, where the goal is to release useful data while also
limiting the exposure of associated sensitive information.
Approaches that involve data modification must consider the
tradeoff between concealing sensitive information and mini-
mizing distortion to preserve data utility. However, practical
optimization of this tradeoff can be challenging when we
wish to quantify privacy via statistical measures (such as
mutual information) and the actual statistical distributions of
data are unknown. In this paper, we propose a data-driven
framework involving adversarially trained neural networks
to design privacy-preserving data release mechanisms that
approach the information-theoretically optimal privacy-utility
tradeoffs.
Privacy-preserving data release is a broad and widely ex-
plored field, where the study of principled methods have
been well motivated by highly publicized leaks stemming
from the inadequacy of simple anonymization techniques,
such as reported in [29], [24]. A wide variety of methods to
statistically quantify and address privacy have been proposed,
such as k-anonymity [30], L-diversity [18], t-closeness [16],
and differential privacy [5]. In our work, we focus on an
information-theoretic approach where privacy is quantified
by the mutual information between the data release and the
sensitive information [35], [27], [3], [28], [2].
Unlike the other privacy measures mentioned earlier, mutual
information depends specifically on the statistical distribution
of the data. Requiring consideration of the data distribution
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is a practical hindrance, however measuring privacy while
ignoring the data distribution altogether can weaken the scope
of privacy guarantees. For example, an adversary armed with
only mild knowledge about the correlation of the data1 can
undermine the practical privacy protection of differential pri-
vacy, as noted in examples given by [13], [3], [17], [34].
While model assumptions are avoided in the definition of
differential privacy, independence across individuals in the
dataset is implicitly required to avoid undermining privacy
guarantees [13]. The example in [3, Sec. V] demonstrates
that an -differentially private mechanism can leak sensitive
information on the order of O(2 log n), in terms of mutual in-
formation, where n is size of the dataset. Moreover, differential
privacy does not satisfy the so-called linkage inequality [34,
Def. 2], which captures the notion that privacy guarantees
should also limit the disclosure of other sensitive information
linked to the primary data considered, as explained further
in [34]. While settling the debate over which privacy measure
is most appropriate is beyond the scope of this paper, we
nonetheless focus on mutual information privacy, and develop
a data-driven approach that addresses the practical drawback
of requiring distributional knowledge for mutual information
privacy.
We build upon the non-asymptotic, information-theoretic
framework introduced by [27], [3], where the sensitive and
useful data are respectively modeled as random variables
X and Y . We also adopt the extension considered in [2],
where only a (potentially partial and/or noisy) observation
W of the data is available. In this framework, the design
of the privacy-preserving mechanism to release Z is formu-
lated as the optimization of the tradeoff between minimizing
privacy-leakage quantified by the mutual information I(X;Z)
and minimizing an expected distortion E[d(Y,Z)]. This non-
asymptotic framework has strong connections to generalized
rate-distortion problems (see discussion in [27], [3], [34]), as
well as related asymptotic privacy frameworks where com-
munication efficiency is also considered in a rate-distortion-
privacy tradeoff [35], [28].
In principle, when the data distribution is known, the
optimal design of the privacy-preserving mechanism can be
tackled as a convex optimization problem [27], [3]. However,
in practice, model knowledge is often missing or inaccurate
for realistic data sets, and the optimization becomes intractable
for high-dimensional and continuous data. Addressing these
challenges, we propose a data-driven approach that optimizes
the privacy-preserving mechanism to attain the theoretically
optimal privacy-utility tradeoffs, by learning from a set of
training data rather than requiring model knowledge. We
1Note that even when data samples are inherently independent, the prior
knowledge of an adversary could become correlated when conditioned on
particular side information.
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2call this approach Privacy-Preserving Adversarial Networks
(PPAN) since the mechanism, realized as a randomized neural
network, is trained along with an adversarial network that
attempts to recover the sensitive information from the released
data. The key to attaining information-theoretic privacy is that
the adversarial network specifically estimates the posterior dis-
tribution (rather than only the value) of the sensitive variable
given the released data to enable a variational approximation
of mutual information [1]. While the adversary is trained to
minimize the log-loss with respect to this posterior estimate,
the mechanism network is trained to attain the dual objectives
of minimizing distortion and concealing sensitive information
(by maximizing the adversarial loss).
A. Related Work
The general concept of adversarial training of neural net-
works was introduced by [7], which proposed Generative
Adversarial Networks (GAN) for learning generative models
that can synthesize new data samples. Since their introduction,
GANs have inspired a large and growing number of adversar-
ially trained neural network architectures for a wide variety of
purposes [10].
The earlier works of [6], [8], [9] have also proposed adver-
sarial training frameworks for optimizing privacy-preserving
mechanisms, where the adversarial network is realized as a
classifier that attempts to recover a discrete sensitive variable.
In [6], the mechanism is realized as an autoencoder, and
the adversary attempts to predict a binary sensitive variable
from the latent representation. In the framework of [8], [9],
a deterministic mechanism is trained with the adversarial
network realized as a classifier attempting to predict the
sensitive variable from the output of the mechanism. Both
of these frameworks additionally propose using an optional
predictor network that attempts to predict a useful variable
from the output of the mechanism network. Thus, while the
adversarial network is trained to recover the sensitive variable,
the mechanism and predictor (if present) networks are trained
to realize multiple objectives: maximizing the loss of the
adversary as well as minimizing the reconstruction loss of
the mechanism network and/or the prediction loss of the
predictor network. However, a significant limitation of both
of these approaches is that they consider only deterministic2
mechanisms, which generally do not achieve the optimal
privacy-utility tradeoffs, although neither attempts to address
information-theoretic privacy. The work of [23] employs an
adversarial framework similar to [6] to preserve gender-privacy
of face images while retaining biometric recognition utility.
Within the broader context of empirical privacy measures
addressed via adversarial training, [25] considers an adver-
sarial framework for learning accurate predictive models that
preserve the membership privacy of individuals that may be
in the training dataset.
The recent, independent work of [11] proposes a similar
adversarial training framework, which also realizes the neces-
sity of and proposes randomized mechanism networks, in order
2While [8], [9] does also consider a “noisy” version of their mechanism,
the randomization is limited to only independent, additive noise before or
after deterministic filtering.
to address the information-theoretically optimal privacy-utility
tradeoffs. They also rediscover the earlier realization of [3] that
mutual information privacy arises from an adversary (which
outputs a distribution) that is optimized with respect to log-
loss. However, their framework does not make the connections
to a general variational approximation of mutual information
applicable to arbitrary (i.e., discrete, continuous, and/or mul-
tivariate) sensitive variable alphabets, and hence their data-
driven formulation and empirical evaluation is limited to only
binary sensitive variables.
B. Contributions and Paper Outline
Our framework, presented in Section II, provides the
first data-driven approach for optimizing privacy-preserving
data release mechanisms that approaches the information-
theoretically optimal privacy-utility tradeoffs. A key novelty
of our approach is the use of adversarial training to perform
a variational approximation of mutual information privacy.
Unlike previous work, our approach can handle randomized
data release mechanisms where the input to the mechanism can
be a general observation of the data, e.g., a full or potentially
noisy/partial view of the sensitive and useful variables.
In our proposed framework all of the variables that are
involved can be discrete, continuous, and/or high-dimensional
vectors. We develop specific network architectures and sam-
pling methods appropriate for various scenarios in Sec-
tion II-C. In particular, when all of the variables have finite
alphabets, we demonstrate that the network architectures can
be efficiently minimalized to essentially just the matrices
describing the conditional distributions, and that replacing
sampling with a directly computed expectation improves train-
ing performance.
We evaluate our PPAN approach in Section III with ex-
periments on synthetic data and the MNIST handwritten
digit dataset. For the synthetic data experiment, we demon-
strate that PPAN closely approaches the theoretically optimal
privacy-utility tradeoff. In Section III-A, we consider synthetic
discrete-valued data following a symmetric pair distribution
and compare the privacy-utility tradeoff results with an ap-
proach addressing the same problem in [20]. In Section III-B3,
we consider scalar jointly Gaussian sensitive and useful at-
tributes and benchmark the performance of PPAN against the
theoretically optimal privacy-utility tradeoff. In Section III-B2,
we demonstrate how the PPAN framework can be used to
generate rate-distortion curves studied in information theory,
purely from samples. Finally in Section IV and Appendix B,
we provide and derive analytical expressions for the optimal
privacy-utility tradeoffs for Gaussian distributed data and mean
square error distortion. In the rest of the appendices, we
present some extensions of our framework and visualizations.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PPAN METHODS
A. Privacy-Utility Tradeoff Optimization
We consider the privacy-utility tradeoff optimization prob-
lem described in [2], which extends the frameworks initiated
by [27], [3]. Figure 1 depicts the problem setting where
observed data W , sensitive attributes X , and useful attributes
3Y are modeled as random variables that are jointly distributed
according to a data model PW,X,Y over the spaceW×X ×Y .
The observed data W is a potentially noisy/partial observation
of the sensitive and useful data attributes (X,Y ). The goal is to
design and optimize the data release mechanism, i.e., a system
that processes the observed data W to produce a release Z ∈ Z
that minimizes the privacy-leakage of the sensitive attributes
X , while also maximizing the utility gained from revealing
information about Y . This system is specified by the release
mechanism PZ|W , with (W,X, Y, Z) ∼ PW,X,Y PZ|W , and
thus (X,Y ) ↔ W ↔ Z forms a Markov chain. Privacy-
leakage is quantified by the mutual information I(X;Z)
between the sensitive attributes X and the release Z. Utility
is inversely quantified by the expected distortion E[d(Y,Z)]
between the useful attributes Y and the release Z, where the
distortion function d : Y×Z → [0,∞) is given by the applica-
tion. The design of the release mechanism PZ|W is formulated
as the following privacy-utility tradeoff optimization problem,
min
PZ|W :(X,Y )↔W↔Z
I(X;Z), s.t. E[d(Y, Z)] ≤ δ, (1)
where the parameter δ indicates the distortion (or disutility)
budget allowed for the sake of preserving privacy.
Attribute
Model PX,Y
Sensitive X
Useful Y
Observed
W Release
Z
Observation
Model PW|X,Y
Data Release
Mechanism PZ|W
Fig. 1: Setting for privacy-utility tradeoff optimization.
As noted in [2], given a fixed data model PW,X,Y and
distortion function d, the problem in (1) is a convex optimiza-
tion problem, since the mutual information objective I(X;Z)
is a convex functional of PZ|X , which is in turn a linear
functional of PZ|W , and the expected distortion E[d(Y,Z)]
is a linear functional of PY,Z and hence also of PZ|W . While
the treatment in [2] considers discrete variables over finite
alphabets, the formulation of (1) need not be limited those
assumptions. Thus, in this work, we seek to also address
this problem with high-dimensional, continuous variables.
Although outside the focus of this work, in Appendix C we
discuss how mutual information privacy is impacted if there
is some side information about X available to an attacker. In
Appendix D, we discuss how to handle mutual information as
a utility function within the PPAN framework as opposed to
expected distortion that we focus on in this work.
B. Adversarial Training for an Unknown Data Model
Sensitive XUseful Y
Observed
Data W
Released Data
Z~Pθ(z|w)
Release
Mechanism
Pθ(z|w)
Privacy
Adversary
Qϕ(x|z)
Likelihoods
Qϕ(x|Z)
Distortion
E[d(Y,Z)]
Privacy Loss
E[log Qϕ(X|Z)]
Fig. 2: Adversarial training framework.
Our aim is to solve the privacy-utility tradeoff optimization
problem when the data model PW,X,Y is unknown but instead
a set of training samples: {(wi, xi, yi)}ni=1 ∼ i.i.d.PW,X,Y is
available.3 A key to our approach is approximating I(X;Z)
via a variational lower bound given by [1] and also used in [4].
This bound is based on the following identity which holds for
any distribution QX|Z over X given values in Z
−h(X|Z) = KL(PX|Z‖QX|Z) + E
[
logQX|Z(X|Z)
]
,
where KL(·‖·) denotes the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
Therefore, since I(X;Z) = h(X) − h(X|Z) and KL diver-
gence is nonnegative,
h(X) + max
QX|Z
E
[
logQX|Z(X|Z)
]
= I(X;Z), (2)
where the maximum is attained when the variational posterior
QX|Z = PX|Z . Using (2) with the constant h(X) term
dropped, we convert the formulation of (1) to an unconstrained
minimax optimization problem,
min
PZ|W
max
QX|Z
E
[
logQX|Z(X|Z)
]
+ λE
[
d(Y,Z)
]
, (3)
where the expectations are with respect to (W,X, Y, Z) ∼
PW,X,Y PZ|W , and the parameter λ > 0 can be adjusted to
obtain various points on the optimal privacy-utility tradeoff
curve. Alternatively, to target a specific distortion budget δ,
the second term in (3) could be replaced with a penalty term
λ(max(0,E[d(Y, Z)] − δ))2, where λ > 0 is made relatively
large to penalize exceeding the budget. The expectations in (3)
can be conveniently approximated by Monte Carlo sampling
over training set batches.
The minimax formulation of (3) can be interpreted and
realized in an adversarial training framework (as illustrated
by Figure 2), where the variational posterior QX|Z is viewed
as the posterior likelihood estimates of the sensitive attributes
X made by an adversary observing the release Z. The data
release mechanism is trained to minimize both the distortion
and privacy loss terms, while the adversary is trained to max-
imize the privacy loss. Specifically, the adversary attempts to
maximize the negative log-loss E[logQX|Z(X|Z)], which the
release mechanism PZ|W attempts to minimize. The release
mechanism and adversary are realized as neural networks,
which take as inputs W and Z, respectively, and produce the
parameters that specify their respective distributions PZ|W and
QX|Z within parametric families that are appropriate for the
given application. For e.g., a release mechanism suitable for
the release space Z = Rd could be the multivariate Gaussian
PZ|W (z|w) = N (z; (µ,Σ) = fθ(w)),
where the mean µ and covariance Σ are determined by
a neural network fθ as a function of w and controlled
by the parameters θ. For brevity of notation, we will use
Pθ(z|w) to denote the distribution defined by the release
mechanism network fθ. Similarly, we will let Qφ(x|z) denote
the parametric distribution defined by the adversary network
that is controlled by the parameters φ. For each training
3For the case when X is not explicitly available during training, or it is
vaguely defined, please see the discussion in Appendix E.
4sample tuple (wi, xi, yi), we sample k independent releases
{zi,j}kj=1 iid∼ Pθ(z|wi) to approximate the loss term with
Li(θ, φ) := 1
k
k∑
j=1
[logQφ(xi|zi,j) + λd(yi, zi,j)] . (4)
The networks are optimized with respect to these loss terms
averaged over the training data (or mini-batches)
min
θ
max
φ
1
n
n∑
i=1
Li(θ, φ), (5)
which approximates the theoretical privacy-utility tradeoff
optimization problem as given in (3), since by the law of large
numbers, as n→∞,
1
n
n∑
i=1
Li(θ, φ) a.s.−−→ E[ logQφ(X|Z) + λd(Y, Z)],
where the expectation is with respect to (W,X, Y, Z) ∼
PW,X,Y Pθ(z|w). Similarly, the second term in (4) could be
replaced with a penalty term λ(max(0, d(yi, zi,j) − δ))2 to
target a specific distortion budget δ. Similar to GANs [7],
the minimax optimization in (5) can be more practically
handled by alternating gradient descent/ascent between the two
networks (possibly with multiple inner maximization updates
per outer minimization update) rather than optimizing the
adversary network until convergence for each release mech-
anism network update. See Appendix A for the pseudocode
description of the algorithm.
C. Sampling the Release Mechanism
To allow optimization of the networks via gradient methods,
the release samples need to be generated such that the gradi-
ents of the loss terms can be readily calculated. Various forms
of the release mechanism distribution Pθ(z|w) are appropriate
for different applications, and each require their own specific
sampling methods. Finite alphabet models are appropriate for
categorical data such as star ratings and quantized census data
whereas Gaussian, mixture of Gaussian or more general real-
valued models are more appropriate for voice, image, video,
and other physical sensor data.
1) Finite Alphabets: When the release space Z is a finite
discrete set, we can forgo sampling altogether and calculate
the loss terms via
Lidisc(θ, φ) :=
∑
z∈Z
Pθ(z|wi)(logQφ(xi|z) + λd(yi, z)), (6)
which replaces the empirical average over k samples with the
direct expectation over Z. We found that this direct expectation
produced better results than estimation via sampling, such as
by applying the Gumbel-softmax categorical reparameteriza-
tion trick (see [19], [12]). Here we assume that the alphabet
size is known. Since this is a data-driven mechanism, we will
obtain good performance if the empirical distribution of the
training data does not diverge much from the actual unknown
dataset distribution. This is often a standard assumption in
different setups, for e.g., in the Probably Approximately
Correct (PAC) notion of learning. In practice, Bayesian priors
for the estimation of the conditional distributions that appear
in (6) could also be incorporated in order to mitigate the curse-
of-dimensionality issue wherein the alphabet sizes are much
larger than the size of the training set.
Further, if W and X are also finite alphabets, then Pθ(z|w)
and Qφ(x|z) can be exactly parameterized by matrices of
size |Z| × |W| and |X | × |Z|, respectively. Thus, in the
purely finite alphabet case, with the variables represented
as one-hot vectors, the mechanism and adversary are most
efficiently realized as networks with no hidden layers and
softmax applied to the output (to yield stochastic vectors).
2) Gaussian Approximations for Reals: A multivariate
Gaussian release mechanism can be sampled by employing the
reparameterization trick of [15], which first samples a vector of
independent standard normal variables u ∼ N (0, I), and then
generates z = Au+µ, where the parameters (µ,A) = fθ(w)
are produced by the release mechanism network to specify a
conditional Gaussian with mean µ and covariance Σ = AAT .
This approach can be extended to Gaussian Mixture Models
as explained in Appendix F.
3) Universal Approximators: Another approach, as seen
in [22], is to directly produce the release sample as z =
fθ(w, u) using a neural network that takes random seed noise
u as an additional input. The seed noise u can be sampled
from a simple distribution (e.g., uniform, Gaussian, etc.) and
provides the randomization of z with respect to w. Since
the transformations applying the seed noise can, in principle,
be learned, this approach could potentially approximate any
“nice” distribution due to the universal approximation prop-
erties of neural networks. However, although it is not needed
for training, it is generally intractable to produce an explicit
expression for Pθ(z|w) as implied by the network.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the privacy-utility tradeoffs that
are achieved by our PPAN framework in experiments with
synthetic and real data. For the synthetic data experiments,
we show that the results obtained by PPAN (which does not
require model knowledge and instead uses training data) are
very close to the theoretically optimal tradeoffs obtained from
optimizing (1) with full model knowledge. In the experiments
with discrete synthetic data presented in Section III-A, we also
compare PPAN against the approach of [20], where first an
approximate discrete distribution is estimated from the training
data, which is then used in place of the true distribution for the
optimization in (1). This two-step procedure involves model
estimation as its first step, and is in general not tractable for
high-dimensional continuous distributions. For the synthetic
data experiment, we consider Gaussian joint distribution over
the sensitive, useful, and observed data, for which we can
compare the results obtained by PPAN against the theoretically
optimal tradeoffs (derived in Section IV). We use the MNIST
handwritten digits dataset to illustrate the application of the
PPAN framework to real data in Section III-C. We demon-
strate optimized networks that can trace the tradeoff between
concealing the digit and reducing image distortion. Table I
summarizes the data models and distortion metrics that we use
5TABLE I: The models used for obtaining synthetic training and test datasets in our experiments.
Case Attribute Model Observation Distortion Metric
Discrete, Sec. III-A (X,Y ) symmetric pair for
m = 10, p = 0.4, see (7)
W = Y and
W = (X,Y )
Pr[Y 6= Z]
Continuous, Sec. III-B4
[
X
Y
] ∼ N (0, [ I5 diag(ρ)
diag(ρ) I5
])
,
ρ = [0.47, 0.24, 0.85, 0.07, 0.66]
W = Y E[‖Y − Z‖2]
Continuous, Sec. III-B3
[
X
Y
] ∼ N (0, [ 1 0.850.85 1 ]) W = Y and
W = (X,Y )
E[(Y − Z)2]
Continuous, Sec. III-B2 X = Y ∼ N (0,diag(σ2)),
σ2 = [0.47, 0.24, 0.85, 0.07, 0.66]
W = X = Y E[‖Y − Z‖2]
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Fig. 3: Comparison of PPAN performance against the conven-
tional model estimation approach of [20] and the theoretical
optimum, for two observation scenarios: full data observed, i.e.
W = (X,Y ), shown by solid lines, and only useful attribute
observed, i.e. W = Y , shown by dashed lines.
in our experiments. Our experiments were implemented using
the Chainer deep learning framework [33], with optimization
performed by their implementation of Adam [14]. We used the
Chainer-default Adam parameters in all of our experiments:
α = 0.001, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999,  = 10−8.
A. Discrete Synthetic Data
In our experiments with discrete data, we will consider
two observation models, full data (where W = (X,Y )) and
useful data only (where W = Y ). We use a toy distribution
for the attributes for which the theoretically optimal privacy-
utility tradeoffs have been analytically derived in [34], using
probability of error as the distortion metric, i.e., E[1(Y 6=
Z)] = Pr[Y 6= Z]. Specifically, we consider sensitive and
useful attributes that are distributed over the finite alphabets
X = Y = {0, . . . ,m−1}, with m≥2 and parameter p ∈ [0, 1],
according to the symmetric pair distribution given by
PX,Y (x, y) =
{
1−p
m , if x = y,
p
m(m−1) , otherwise.
(7)
1) Network Architecture and Evaluation: As mentioned
in Section II-C1, the network architecture for the release
mechanism and adversary can be reduced to a bare minimum
when all of the variables are finite-alphabet. Each network
simply applies a single linear transformation (with no bias
term) on the one-hot encoded input, followed by the softmax
operation to yield a stochastic vector. The mechanism network
takes as input w encoded as a one-hot column vector w
and outputs Pθ(·|w) = softmax(Gw), where the network
parameters θ = G are the entries of a |Z| × |W| real matrix.
Note that applying the softmax operation to each column
of G produces the conditional distribution PZ|W describing
the mechanism. Similarly, the attacker network is realized as
Qφ(·|z) = softmax(Az), where z is the one-hot encoding
of z, and the network parameters φ = A are entries of a
|X | × |Z| real matrix. We optimize these networks according
to (5), using the penalty term modification of the loss terms
in (6) as given by
Lidisc(θ, φ) :=∑
z∈Z
Pθ(z|wi)
(
logQφ(xi|z) + λmax(0, d(yi, z)− δ)2
)
.
We use λ = 500 in these experiments.
In Figure 3, we compare the results of PPAN against the
theoretical baselines given by [34] (c.f. Appendix G), as
well as against a conventional approach suggested by [20],
where the joint distribution of PW,X,Y is estimated from the
training data and then used in the convex optimization of (1).
We can see that the PPAN mechanism learns a data release
distribution that has close to optimal privacy leakage for a
wide range of distortion values. We used 1000 training samples
generated according to the symmetric pair distribution in (7)
with m = 10 and p = 0.4. The PPAN networks were trained
for 2500 epochs (for the full data observation case) with a
minibatch size of 100, with each network alternatingly updated
once per iteration. For the useful data only observation case,
2000 epochs were used. For evaluating both the PPAN and
conventional approaches, we computed the mutual informa-
tion and probability of error from the joint distribution that
combines the optimized PZ|W with the true PX,Y,W .
B. Gaussian Synthetic Data
In this section, we consider scalar and multivariate jointly
Gaussian sensitive and useful attributes. We evaluate the
performance of PPAN on synthetic data following this model
in various scenarios. The distortion metric is the mean squared
error between the release and the useful attribute. As we
note in Section IV, the optimum release for the scenarios
considered here is jointly Gaussian with the attributes. Thus
we could use a mechanism network architecture that can
realize the procedure described in Section II-C2 to generate
the release. However, since the optimal release distribution is
6not known for general attribute models, we use the universal
approximator technique described in Section II-C3.
The mechanism implemented in these experiments consists
of three fully connected layers, with the ReLU activation
function applied at the outputs of the two hidden layers,
and no activation function is used at the output layer. The
mechanism takes as input observation W and seed noise U ,
and generates the release Z = fθ(W,U), where θ denotes
the parameters of the mechanism network. Components of
the seed noise vector are i.i.d. Uniform[−1, 1]. The adversary
network, with parameters denoted by φ, models the posterior
probability Qφ(X|Z) of the sensitive attribute given the re-
lease. We assume that Qφ(·|z) is a normal distribution with
mean vector µφ(z) and covariance matrix diag(σ2φ(z)), i.e.,
they are functions of the release z. The adversary network has
three fully connected layers to learn the mean and variances.
The network takes as input the release z and outputs the pair
(µφ(z), logσ
2
φ(z)), where the log is applied componentwise
on the variance vector. We use the adversarial networks to
solve the min-max optimization problem described in (5). We
choose k = 1 in (4), and similar to the previous section, we
use the penalty modification of the distortion term, i.e.,
Ligauss(θ, φ) = logQφ(xi|zi) + λ(max(0, ‖yi − zi‖2 − δ))2.
(8)
The parameter δ is swept through a linearly spaced range
of values. The values chosen for the multiplier λ and the
distortion budget δ in various experiments is described in
the sections below. For each value of δ, we sample the data
model to obtain an independent dataset realization and use it
to train and test the adversarial networks. We use 8000 training
samples and evaluate the performance of PPAN on 4000 test
samples. For the scalar data experiments, both networks have
5 nodes per hidden layer, while 20 nodes per hidden layer
were used for the multivariate data experiments. Each hidden
layer has 20 nodes. The adversarial networks were trained for
250 epochs with a minibatch size of 200. In each iteration we
do 5 gradient descent steps to update the parameters of the
adversary network before updating the mechanism network.
1) Estimating Mutual Information Leakage: Distortion
caused by a release is estimated by the empirical mean
squared error with respect to the testing samples. However,
estimating mutual information to evaluate privacy leakage
is less straightforward since the joint distribution PX,Z as
realized by the optimized mechanism is not available explic-
itly. Since for these experiments, the optimal release Z is
jointly Gaussian with X (as we show in Section IV), we
estimate I(X;Z) via a Gaussian approximation. Specifically,
we use the expression for the mutual information of jointly
Gaussian random vectors and replace all covariance matri-
ces that appear there by their empirical counterparts, i.e.,
Iˆ(X;Z) = 0.5 log(det(ΣˆX)/ det(ΣˆX|Z)), where ΣˆX|Z :=
ΣˆX − ΣˆX,ZΣˆ+Z ΣˆTX,Z and ΣˆX denotes the empirical self
covariance matrix of X , Σˆ+Z denotes the pseudoinverse of the
empirical self covariance matrix of Z, and ΣˆX,Z denotes their
empirical cross covariance matrix. This underestimates the true
mutual information leakage since
I(X;Z) = h(X)− h(X − Ê[X|Z]|Z)
≥ h(X)− h(X − Ê[X|Z]) = Iˆ(X;Z),
where Ê[X|Z] is the linear MMSE estimate of X as a
function of Z. We use this estimate only for its simplicity,
and one could use other non-parametric estimates of mutual
information [26].
2) Rate Distortion: We can apply the PPAN framework to
the problem of computing the minimum required rate of a
code that describes a multivariate source X to within a target
value of expected distortion. This is a standard problem in
information theory when the source distribution is known,
for example, see Chapter 10 of [31]. However, the PPAN
framework can be used to empirically approximate the rate-
distortion curve from i.i.d. samples of the source without
knowledge of the source distribution. The computation of the
rate-distortion function can be viewed as a degenerate case of
the PPAN framework with W = X = Y , i.e., the sensitive
and useful attributes are the same and the observed dataset is
the attribute. The release Z corresponds to an estimate Xˆ with
expected distortion less than a target level while retaining as
much expected uncertainty about X as possible.
We illustrate the PPAN approach using a Gaussian
source X ∈ R5 and mean squared error distortion. For
the experiment, we choose the attribute model X ∼
N (0,diag(0.47, 0.24, 0.85, 0.07, 0.66)) and the value λ =
500. We run the experiment for 20 different values of the
target distortion, linearly spaced between 0 to 2.5. The inputs
to the adversarial network are realizations of the attributes and
seed noise. The seed noise is chosen to be a random vector
of length 8 with each component i.i.d. Uniform[−1, 1]. The
network architecture and values of other hyperparameters are
the same as those used for multivariate Gaussian attributes in
Section III-B. Using the learned parameters θ?, the mechanism
network generates a release as Z = fθ?(W,U) = fθ?(X,U).
The distortion is estimated by the empirical mean squared
error of the release with respect to the training samples. The
privacy loss is quantified by the estimate Iˆ(X;Z) as described
in Section III-B1.
The optimal privacy-utility tradeoff (or, rate-distortion)
curve is R(D) = minP (Z|X) : E||X−Z||2≤D I(X;Z) =∑5
j=1 max{0, 0.5 log((σ[j])2/Dj)} [31], where σ2 are the
true variance parameters of the attribute distribution and∑5
j=1Dj = D. The values of Dj for each component is
obtained using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for
the constrained optimization problem, the solution of which is
a standard waterfilling procedure.
We plot the (privacy-leakage, utility loss) pairs returned by
the PPAN mechanism along with the optimal tradeoff curve in
Figure 4. One can see that the operating points attained by the
PPAN mechanism are very close to the theoretical optimum
tradeoff for a wide range of target distortion values.
3) Scalar Gaussian Attributes: Consider jointly Gaus-
sian sensitive and useful attributes such that [XY ] ∼
N ([ 00 ], [ 1 0.850.85 1 ]). We analyze two different observation
models here: W = Y , called useful data only (UD) and
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Fig. 4: Comparison of results obtained by PPAN versus the the
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where X = Y = W is multivariate Gaussian.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of the results achieved by PPAN versus
the theoretical optimum tradeoff curve, with jointly Gaussian
scalar (X,Y ), for the useful data only (i.e., W = Y ) and the
full data (i.e., W = (X,Y )) observation models.
W = (X,Y ), called full data (FD). The distortion metric is
the mean squared error between the release and the useful
attribute. The seed noise is a scalar random variable following
Uniform[−1, 1]. The values of the multipliers chosen are:
λUD = 10 and λFD = 50. In each case, we run experiments for
20 different values of the target distortion with δUD ∈ [0, 1]
and δFD ∈ [0, 0.8]. The privacy-leakage and distortion values
returned by the PPAN mechanism on the test set are plotted
along with the optimal tradeoff curves (from Propositions 1
and 3) in Figure 5. In both the observation models, we observe
that the PPAN mechanism generates releases that have nearly
optimal privacy-leakage over a range of distortion values.
4) Multivariate Gaussian Attributes: Consider multivari-
ate jointly Gaussian sensitive and useful attributes [XY ] ∼
N
(
0,
[
I5 diag(ρ)
diag(ρ) I5
])
where both X,Y ∈ R5 and ρ =
[0.47, 0.24, 0.85, 0.07, 0.66]. The observation model is UD,
i.e., W = Y . We choose the multiplier λ = 10 and 20 linearly
spaced values for δ in the range [0, 4.5]. The seed noise is a
vector with 8 components. We plot the privacy-leakage and
distortion values returned by the PPAN mechanism on the
test set along with the optimal tradeoff curve (from Proposi-
tion 2) in Figure 6. The privacy-leakage values were estimated
following the procedure in Section III-B1. The performance
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(X,Y ).
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Fig. 7: A digit ‘4’ from the MNIST test set and the release
generated by a PPAN mechanism trained at λ = 25. Adding
random noise to each pixel for the same amount of total noise
results in the third image.
of the PPAN mechanism is very close to the theoretically
optimum tradeoff curve over a wide range of target distortion
values. We visualize the true data attributes and the released
attributes obtained by a trained PPAN mechanism in Figure 12
of Appendix H.
C. MNIST Handwritten Digits
The MNIST dataset consists of 70K labeled images of
handwritten digits split into training and test sets of 60K and
10K images, respectively. Each image consists of 28 × 28
grayscale pixels, which we handle as vectors in [0, 1]784. In
the first set of experiments, we consider the image to be both
the useful and the observed data, i.e., W = Y , the digit label
to be the sensitive attribute X , and the mechanism release as
an image Z ∈ [0, 1]784. We measure the distortion between
the original and released images Y,Z as
d(Y,Z) :=
−1
784
784∑
i=1
Y [i] log(Z[i]) + (1−Y [i]) log(1−Z[i]),
which, for a fixed Y , corresponds to minimizing the average
KL-divergence between corresponding pixels that are each
treated as a Bernoulli distribution. Thus, the privacy objective
is to conceal the digit, while the utility objective is to minimize
(average pixel-level) image distortion.
The mechanism and adversary networks both use two hid-
den layers with 1000 nodes each and fully-connected links
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Fig. 8: Evaluation of the distortion vs privacy tradeoffs for
PPAN applied to the MNIST test set, with privacy measured by
adversary accuracy (in red) and estimated mutual information
(in blue).
between all layers. The hidden layers use tanh as the activa-
tion function. The mechanism input layer uses 784+20 nodes
for the image concatenated with 20 random Uniform[−1, 1]
seed noise values. The mechanism output layer uses 784 nodes
with the sigmoid activation function to directly produce an
image in [0, 1]784. Note that the mechanism network is an
example of the universal approximator architecture mentioned
in Section II-C3. The attacker input layer uses 784 nodes
to receive the image produced by the mechanism. The at-
tacker output layer uses 10 nodes normalized with a softmax
activation function to produce a distribution over the digit
labels {0, . . . , 9}. We focus on a particular digit and the
corresponding release generated by PPAN in Figure 7. PPAN
learns to add noise at strategic pixels so as to best confound
the digit. The third panel shows that adding random noise to
each pixel, while keeping the total amount of noise added the
same, is not effective at concealing the digit.
In a second set of experiments, we employ the standard
GAN approach of adding a discriminator network to further
encourage the mechanism to produce output images that re-
semble realistic digits. The discriminator network architecture
uses a single hidden layer with 500 nodes, and has an output
layer with one node that uses the sigmoid activation function.
The discriminator network, denoted by Dψ with parameters ψ,
attempts to distinguish the outputs of the mechanism network
from the original training images. Its contribution to the overall
loss is controlled by a parameter γ ≥ 0 (with zero indicating
its absence). Incorporating this additional network, the training
loss terms are given by
Limnist(θ, φ, ψ) := logQφ(xi|zi) + λd(yi, zi)
+ γ logDψ(zi) + γ log(1−Dψ(yi)), (9)
where zi is generated from the input image wi = yi by
the mechanism network controlled by the parameters θ. The
overall adversarial optimization objective with both the privacy
adversary and the discriminator is given by
min
θ
max
φ,ψ
1
n
n∑
i=1
Limnist(θ, φ, ψ).
(a) Without additional discriminator (i.e., γ = 0).
(b) With additional discriminator (γ = 2).
Fig. 9: Examples from applying PPAN to conceal MNIST
handwritten digits. Top row consists of the original test set
examples input to the mechanism, while other rows show
corresponding mechanism outputs at different tradeoff points.
We used the 10K test images to objectively evaluate the
performance of the trained mechanisms for Figure 8, which
depicts image distortion versus privacy measured by the accu-
racy of the adversary in recognizing the original digit and the
variational lower bound for mutual information obtained by
using the posterior distribution of the sensitive attribute learnt
by the adversary in (2).
Figure 9 shows example results from applying trained
privacy mechanisms to MNIST test set examples. The first
row depicts the original test set examples input to the mecha-
nism, while the remaining rows each depict the corresponding
outputs from a mechanism trained with different values for λ.
From the second to last rows, the value of λ is decreased (from
35 to 8), reducing the emphasis on minimizing distortion. We
see that the outputs start from accurate reconstructions and
become progressively more distorted while the digit becomes
more difficult to correctly recognize as λ decreases. Figure 9a
shows the results with the standard PPAN formulation, trained
via (9) with γ = 0, where we see that the mechanism
seems to learn to minimize distortion while rendering the digit
unrecognizable, which in some cases results in an output that
resembles a different digit. Figure 9b shows the results for the
second set of experiments when the additional discriminator
network is introduced, which is jointly trained via (9) with
γ = 2. There we see that the additional discriminator network
encourages outputs that more cleanly resemble actual digits,
which required lower values for λ (ranging from 15 to 2) to
9generate distorted images and also led to a more abrupt shift
toward rendering a different digit. For both sets of experiments,
the networks were each alternatingly updated once per batch
(of 100 images) over 50 epochs of the 60K MNIST training
set images.
IV. OPTIMUM PRIVACY UTILITY TRADEOFF FOR
GAUSSIAN ATTRIBUTES
In Section III we compare the (privacy, distortion) pairs
achieved by the model-agnostic PPAN mechanism with the
optimal model-aware privacy-utility tradeoff curve. For jointly
Gaussian attributes and mean squared error distortion, we can
obtain, in some cases, analytical expressions for the optimal
tradeoff curve as described below. Some of the steps in the
proofs use bounding techniques from rate-distortion theory,
which is to be expected given the tractability of the Gaussian
model and the choice of mutual information and mean squared
error as the privacy and utility metrics respectively.
Proposition 1. (Useful Data only: Scalar Gaussian with mean
squared error) In problem (1), let X,Y be jointly Gaussian
scalars with zero means µX = µY = 0, variances σ2X , σ
2
Y
respectively, and correlation coefficient ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Let mean
squared error be the distortion measure. If the observation
W = Y (Useful Data only observation model), then the
optimal release Z corresponding to
min
PZ|Y
I(X;Z), s.t. E(Y − Z)2 ≤ δ and X ↔ Y ↔ Z (10)
is given by
Z =
{
0, if δ ≥ σ2Y
(1− δ/σ2Y )Y + U, if δ < σ2Y
where U ⊥ (X,Y ) and U ∼ N (0, δ(1− δ/σ2Y )). The mutual
information leakage caused by releasing Z is
I(X;Z) = max
{
0,
1
2
log
(
1
1− ρ2 + ρ2δ/σ2Y
)}
.
The result of Proposition 1 is known in the existing lit-
erature, e.g., [27] (see Eq. 8) and [28] (see Example 2).
For completeness, we present the proof of this result in
Appendix B-A. The theoretical tradeoff curve in Figure 5 was
obtained using the expressions in Proposition 1.
The case of Useful Data only observation model for jointly
Gaussian vector attributes and mean squared error is also
considered in [27], where they provide a numerical procedure
to evaluate the tradeoff curve. Here, we focus on a special
case where we can compute the solution analytically.
Consider the generalization to vector variables of (10)
min
PZ|Y
I(X;Z) such that E(Y − Z)T (Y − Z) ≤ δ
and X ↔ Y ↔ Z. (11)
Let X,Y be jointly Gaussian vectors of dimensions m and
n respectively. We assume that X,Y have zero means µX =
µY = 0 and non-singular covariance matrices ΣX ,ΣY  0.
Let ΣXY denote the cross-covariance matrix and P :=
Σ
− 12
X ΣXY Σ
− 12
Y the normalized cross-covariance matrix with
singular value decomposition P = UPΛPV >P . We assume that
all singular values of P , denoted by ρ′i, i = 1, . . . ,min{m,n},
are strictly positive. If
X ′ := U>P Σ
− 12
X X, Y
′ := V >P Σ
− 12
Y Y, and Z
′ := V >P Σ
− 12
Y Z
denote reparameterized variables, then X ′, Y ′ are zero-mean,
jointly Gaussian, with identity covariance matrices Im, In
respectively and m× n diagonal cross-covariance matrix ΛP .
Since the transformation from (X,Z) to (X ′, Z ′) is invertible,
I(X ′;Z ′) = I(X;Z). The mean squared error between Y,Z:
E
[
(Y−Z)>(Y−Z)] = E [(Y ′−Z ′)>(V >P ΣY VP )(Y ′−Z ′)] .
For the special case when V >P ΣY VP = cIn for some c > 0,
the vector problem (11) reduces to the following problem:
min
PZ′|Y ′
I(X ′;Z ′) such that E(Y ′ − Z ′)T (Y ′ − Z ′) ≤ δ/c
and X ′ ↔ Y ′ ↔ Z ′. (12)
Proposition 2. If
[
X′
Y ′
] ∼ N([ 0m0n ], [ Im ΛPΛTP In ]), then the
minimizer of (12) is given by
Z ′i = (1− δ′i)Y ′i + Ui, i = 1, . . . ,min{m,n},
where (U1, . . . , Umin{m,n}) ⊥ (X ′, Y ′) and for all i, Ui ∼
N (0, δ′i(1− δ′i)), δ′i := min{1, t− (ρ′i−2 − 1)}, where ρ′i > 0
denotes the i-th main diagonal entry of ΛP , and the value
of parameter t can be found by the equation
∑
i δ
′
i = δ/c.
The mutual information between the release and the sensitive
attribute is I(X ′, Z ′) =
∑min{m,n}
i=1 max{0,−0.5 log(1 −
ρ′i
2
+ ρ′i
2
δ′i)}.
The proof of the above proposition is given in Ap-
pendix B-B. We evaluate the above parametric expression for
various values of δ in order to obtain the theoretical tradeoff
curves in Figure 6.
For the case of full data observation, we have the following
result.
Proposition 3. (Full Data: Scalar Gaussian with mean
squared error) In problem (1), let X,Y be jointly Gaussian
scalars with zero means, unit variances, and correlation
coefficient ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Let mean squared error be the distortion
measure. If the observation W = (X,Y ) (full data observa-
tion model), then the optimal release Z corresponding to
min
PZ|X,Y
I(X;Z), such that E(Y − Z)2 ≤ δ (13)
is given by
Z = (1− δ)Y − (X − ρY )
√
δ(1− δ)
1− ρ2 .
The mutual information leakage caused by this release is
I(X;Z) = 0 if δ ≥ ρ2, and if δ < ρ2:
I(X;Z) =
1
2
log
 1
1−
(√
ρ2(1− δ)−√(1− ρ2)δ)2
 .
The proof of the above proposition is presented in Ap-
pendix B-C. The theoretical tradeoff curve in Figure 5 was
obtained using the above expression.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this work we introduced and developed a practical, data-
driven method for optimizing privacy-preserving data release
mechanisms within the well-established information-theoretic
framework. The key to this approach is the application of
adversarially-trained neural networks, where the mechanism is
realized as a randomized network, and a second network acts
as a privacy adversary that attempts to recover sensitive infor-
mation. By estimating the posterior distribution of the sensitive
variable given the released data, the adversarial network en-
ables a variational approximation of mutual information. This
allows our method to approach the information-theoretically
optimal privacy-utility tradeoffs, which we demonstrate in ex-
periments with discrete and continuous synthetic data. We also
conducted experiments with the MNIST handwritten digits
dataset, where we trained a mechanism that trades off between
minimizing the pixel-level image distortion and concealing the
digit.
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APPENDIX A
ALGORITHM PSEUDOCODE
The high-level training procedure is the typical iterative net-
work updates by gradient descent with loss gradients estimated
over rotating mini-batches of training data for a given number
of epochs. For each batch of training data {(wi, xi, yi)}ni=1,
the networks are updated as follows:
1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, sample k independent releases
{zi,j}kj=1 iid∼ Pθ(z|wi). See Sections II-C and F for spe-
cific sampling techniques. Note that in our experiments,
we used k = 1, and denote the n total samples by
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{zi}ni=1. This step is skipped for the finite alphabet case
of Section II-C1.
2) Compute the objective
L := 1
n
n∑
i=1
Li(θ, φ),
where Li is given by either (4), (6), (8), (9), or (29)
depending on the specific experiment and sampling
method.
3) Update the adversarial network parameters φ by ascend-
ing the gradient ∇φL.
4) For the MNIST experiment (see Section III-C and (9)),
if an additional discriminator network is used (i.e., γ >
0), update the discriminator network parameters ψ by
ascending the gradient ∇ψL.
5) Recompute the objective L and update the release mech-
anism network parameters θ by descending the gradient
∇θL.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We can expand the mutual information term as follows,
I(X;Z) = h(X)− h(X|Z),
= h(X)− h(X − ρσXZ/σY |Z),
≥ h(X)− h(X − ρσXZ/σY ), (14)
≥ 0.5 log 2pieσ2X − h
(N (0,E[(X − ρσXZ/σY )2]) ,
(15)
=
1
2
log
(
σ2X
E[(X − ρσXZ/σY )2]
)
. (16)
Inequality (14) is true because conditioning can only reduce
entropy and inequality (15) is true since the zero-mean normal
distribution has the maximum entropy for a given value of the
second moment. Let T := X − ρσXY/σY , then T is jointly
Gaussian and we have that
Cov
([
T
Y
])
=
[
1 −ρσX/σY
0 1
] [
σ2X ρσXσY
ρσXσY σ
2
Y
] [
1 0
−ρσX/σY 1
]
=
[
σ2X(1− ρ2) 0
0 σ2Y
]
.
Hence, T is independent of Y . Since X ↔ Y ↔ Z also forms
a Markov chain, we have that T is conditionally independent
of Z given Y . Due to the distortion constraint, we can upper
bound E[(X − ρσXZ/σY )2] in the following manner.
E
[(
X − ρσX
σY
Z
)2 ]
= σ2X +
ρ2σ2X
σ2Y
E[Z2]− 2ρσX
σY
E
[(
T +
ρσX
σY
Y
)
Z
]
,
≤ σ2X +
ρ2σ2X
σ2Y
(δ − σ2Y + 2E[Y Z])
− 2ρσX
σY
(
ρσX
σY
E[Y Z] + E[TZ]
)
, (17)
= σ2X(1− ρ2) + ρ2δσ2X/σ2Y . (18)
Inequality (17) is true because E[(Y − Z)2] ≤ δ, and
equation (18) is true because
E[TZ] = EY [ET,Z|Y [TZ]]
(i)
= EY
[
ET |Y [T ]EZ|Y [Z]
]
(ii)
= EY
[
ET [T ]EZ|Y [Z]
] (iii)
= 0,
where (i) is true because T ⊥ Z | Y , (ii) is true because
T ⊥ Y and (iii) is true because T has zero mean. Thus by
equations (16) and (18), we get that
min
X↔Y↔Z,
E[(Y−Z)2]≤δ
I(X;Z) ≥ max
{
0,
1
2
log
(
1
1− ρ2 + ρ2δ/σ2Y
)}
.
(19)
For the choice of Z as stated in the proposition, we can
check that X and Z are jointly Gaussian with I(X;Z) =
0.5 log2(σ
2
X/Var(X|Z)) and Var(X|Z) = σ2X(1 − ρ2 +
ρ2δ/σ2Y ). Thus Z attains the lower bound for the privacy-
leakage in (19) when δ < σ2Y . Otherwise, the lower bound on
mutual information is 0 and can be attained by Z = 0.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (a) If m ≤ n, then (X ′1, Y ′1), . . . , (X ′m, Y ′m), Y ′m+1,
. . . , Y ′n are independent because they are jointly Gaussian and
for all i 6= j, Cov(X ′i, X ′j) = Cov(X ′i, Y ′j ) = Cov(Y ′i , Y ′j ) =
0. Similarly, if m ≥ n, then (X ′1, Y ′1), . . . , (X ′n, Y ′n), X ′n+1,
. . . , X ′m are independent.
In the following, we use the following well-known proper-
ties of mutual information and conditional mutual information.
For any three random variables A,B,C, (b) I(A;B) =
I(B;A) ≥ 0, (c) I(A;B) = 0⇔ A ⊥ B, (d) I(A;C|B) ≥ 0,
(e) I(A;C|B) = 0 ⇔ (A ⊥ C)|B, (f) I(A;B,C) =
I(A;B) + I(A;C|B) so that I(A;B,C) ≥ I(A;B).
If m ≤ n, then
I(X ′;Z ′) = I(X ′1, . . . , X
′
m;Z
′) (f)=
m∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z
′|X1, . . . , Xi−1)
(f,a,c)
=
m∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z
′, X1, . . . , Xi−1)
(f)
≥
m∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z
′)
(f)
≥
m∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi).
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Similarly, if m ≥ n, I(X ′;Z ′) ≥ ∑mi=1 I(Xi;Z ′) ≥∑n
i=1 I(Xi;Zi). Thus in general,
I(X ′;Z ′) ≥
min{m,n}∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi).
The distortion constraint in (12) implies that∑min{m,n}
i=1 E[(Y ′i − Z ′i)2] ≤ δ/c. Thus the optimal function
value in (12) is lower bounded by the optimum value of the
following problem.
min
PZ′|Y ′
min{m,n}∑
i=1
I(X ′i;Z
′
i) s.t.
min{m,n}∑
i=1
E[(Y ′i−Z ′i)2] ≤
δ
c
and X ′ ↔ Y ′ ↔ Z ′.
≡ min∑
δ′i≤δ/c,
PZ′|Y ′
min{m,n}∑
i=1
I(X ′i;Z
′
i) s.t. ∀i,E[(Y ′i − Z ′i)2] ≤ δ′i
and X ′ ↔ Y ′ ↔ Z ′. (20)
Let Y∼i := {Y1, . . . , Yn}\Yi. Since X ′ ↔ Y ′ ↔ Z ′ forms
a Markov chain, if m ≤ n, we have
0
(e)
= I(X ′;Z ′|Y ′) = I(X1, . . . , Xm;Z ′|Y1, . . . , Yn)
(f)
=
m∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z
′|Y1, . . . , Yn, X1, . . . , Xi−1)
(f,a,c)
=
m∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z
′, X1, . . . , Xi−1, Y∼i|Yi)
(f)
≥
m∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|Yi)
(d)
≥ 0.
Thus,
0 ≥
m∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|Yi) ≥ 0.
A similar expression can be derived for the case m ≥ n.
In general, for all i = 1, . . . ,min{m,n}, Xi ↔ Yi ↔ Zi
forms a Markov chain. Thus for output perturbation, the
Markov constraint on the vectors passes through as a Markov
constraint on the individual components of the variables. We
can therefore rewrite problem (20) as follows,
min∑
δ′i≤δ/c
min{m,n}∑
i=1
min
PZ′
i
|Y ′
i
I(X ′i;Z
′
i), s.t. ∀i,E[(Y ′i − Z ′i)2] ≤ δ′i
and X ′i ↔ Y ′i ↔ Z ′i.
For each i, the solution to the inner constrained minimization
problem is given by Proposition 1. Plugging in the solution
we arrive at the following constrained convex minimization
problem
min∑
δ′i≤δ/c
min{m,n}∑
i=1
max
{
0,
1
2
log
(
1
1− ρ′i2 + ρ′i2δ′i
)}
where ρ′i = E[X ′iY ′i ] and we have used the expression for the
optimal privacy-leakage in the scalar case, i.e., Eq. (19) with
σ2Y = 1. The Lagrangian of the above convex program has the
following form
L(δ′,η, ζ) :=
min{m,n}∑
i=1
1
2
log
(
1
1− ρ′i2 + ρ′i2δ′i
)
+ ζ
min{m,n}∑
i=1
δ′i −
δ
c
+ min{m,n}∑
i=1
ηi(δ
′
i − 1),
where δ′ = (δ′1, . . . , δ
′
min{m,n}), η = (η1, . . . , ηmin{m,n}),
and ζ and all the ηi’s are non-negative Lagrange multipliers.
Here, the non-negativity condition associated with max{0, ·}
has been subsumed by requirement that δ′i ≤ 1 for all i. The
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality are as
follows,
For each i, 0 ≤ δ′i ≤ 1, ηi ≥ 0, ηi(δ′i − 1) = 0,
∂L
∂δ′i
= 0⇒ ηi = 1
2(δ′i − 1 + ρ′i−2)
− ζ,
and
∑min{m,n}
i=1 δ
′
i = δ/c. This implies that if for any i,
(2ζ)−1 > ρ′i
−2 ⇔ ηi > 0, then δ′i = 1,
otherwise δ′i = (2ζ)
−1 − (ρ′i−2 − 1).
The value of (2ζ)−1 can be found by the equation
min{m,n}∑
i=1
max
{
0,min{1, (2ζ)−1 − (ρ′i−2 − 1)}
}
=
δ
c
,
which is a modified water-filling solution. Based on the value
of δ′i, we can construct a Z
′
i that attains the lower bound on
the mutual information by setting σ2Y = 1 in the results of
Proposition (1).
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. In this proposition, X and Y are assumed to be jointly
Gaussian with zero means, unit variances, and correlation
coefficient ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Consider the Linear Minimum Mean
Squared Error (LMMSE) estimate of X given Z denoted as
Ê[X|Z] = E[XZ]Z/E[Z2]. Then, similar to the proof of
Proposition 1, we can expand the mutual information in the
following manner.
I(X;Z) = h(X)− h(X|Z) = h(X)− h(X − Ê[X|Z]|Z)
≥ h(X)− h(X − Ê[X|Z])
≥ h(X)− h
(
N
(
0,E
[ (
X − Ê[X|Z]
)2 ]))
= −1
2
log
(
1− (E[XZ])
2
E[Z2]
)
,
where in writing the last equality we have used the fact that
E
[
Ê[X|Z](X − Ê[X|Z])
]
= 0 by the orthogonality principle
of least squares estimation. Thus, we have that
min
E[(Y−Z)2]≤δ
I(X;Z) ≥ −1
2
log
[
1− min
E[(Y−Z)2]≤δ
(E[XZ])2
E[Z2]
]
(21)
Below, we focus on the minimization problem on the right
side of Eq. (21). It will turn out that for the minimizing
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Z?, we will have equality in Eq. (21). In what follows, it is
helpful to think of the random variables X,Y, Z as vectors
in the vector space L2 of all random variables with finite
second moments over the underlying probability space. We
will emphasize the vector nature by denoting the random
variables X,Y, Z by their corresponding bold lowercase letters
x,y, z respectively. The expectation operator on the product
of two random variables in L2 is an inner product, and hence
we can write the optimization problem of interest as follows,
z? := arg min
z:‖z−y‖2≤δ
|〈x, z〉|2
‖z‖2 = arg minz:‖z−y‖2≤δ |〈x,
z
‖z‖〉|
2,
(22)
where, ‖x‖ = ‖y‖ = 1, and 〈x,y〉 = ρ. Let ıˆ :=
x, ˆ := 1√
1−ρ2 (y − ρx) =
y−ProjSpan(x)(y)
||y−ProjSpan(x)(y)|| , and kˆ :=
z−ProjSpan(x,y)(z)
||z−ProjSpan(x,y)(z)|| . Then ıˆ, ˆ, kˆ are unit vectors along three
orthogonal coordinate axes and y = ρıˆ +
√
1− ρ2ˆ. Let
t := z − y = t1 ıˆ + t2ˆ + t3kˆ so that z = (t1 + ρ)ˆı + (t2 +√
1− ρ2)ˆ+ t3kˆ. Then the problem in Eq. (22) is equivalent
to the following one
(t?1, t
?
2, t
?
3) := arg min
t1,t2,t3:
t21+t
2
2+t
2
3≤δ
[
(t1 + ρ)
2
t21+t
2
2+t
2
3+2t1ρ+2t2
√
1−ρ2+1
]
.
(23)
Case ρ2 ≤ δ: If ρ2 ≤ δ, then t?1 = −ρ, t?2 = t?3 = 0 is a
minimizer of the problem in (23) and z? =
√
1− ρ2ˆ = y −
ρx. This solution is displayed along with x and y in Figure 10
and has an immediate geometric interpretation. One can see
that 〈x, z〉 = 0 which implies that X ⊥ Z because then Z and
X are uncorrelated and Z, being a linear combination of X
and Y , is jointly Gaussian with them. Also then, ‖z−y‖2 ≤ δ,
or equivalently, E[(Y −Z)2] ≤ δ. Thus, the lower bound of 0
for I(X;Z) is attained in (13) by this solution.
Case ρ2 > δ: If (t1, t2, t3) is feasible in (23), i.e., t21+t22+t33 ≤
δ then so is (t′1, t
′
2, t
′
3) := (t1,+
√
t22 + t
2
3, 0). If t3 6= 0 then
(t′1, t
′
2, t
′
3) strictly dominates (t1, t2, t3) because the denom-
inator of the objective function in (23) is strictly larger for
(t′1, t
′
2, t
′
3) than for (t1, t2, t3). Thus, we must have t
?
3 = 0,
otherwise we can strictly improve (i.e., strictly decrease)
the objective function value contradicting the optimality of
(t?1, t
?
2, t
?
3). Geometrically, this means that z
? must lie in the
two dimensional subspace spanned by x and y. Consequently,
the minimization problem in (23) reduces to
(t?1, t
?
2) = arg min
t1,t2:t21+t
2
2≤δ
[
(t1 + ρ)
2
t21 + t
2
2 + 2t1ρ+ 2t2
√
1− ρ2 + 1
]
.
(24)
If (t1, t2) is feasible in (24), i.e., t21 + t
2
2 ≤ δ then so is
(t′1, t
′
2) := (t1,+
√
t22 + (δ − t21 − t22)). If t21 + t22 < δ, then
(t′1, t
′
2) strictly dominates (t1, t2) because the denominator of
the objective function in (24) is strictly larger for (t′1, t
′
2) than
for (t1, t2). Thus, we must have
(t?1)
2 + (t?2)
2 = δ, (25)
√
δ‖z − y‖
x
y
z
ρ
√
1− ρ2
C
O
Fig. 10: Solution to problem (13) for the case when 0 ≤ ρ ≤
+
√
δ. In the figure, x,y represent unit length vectors with
inner product equal to ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The vector z is perpendicular
to x and lies within a distortion sphere of radius
√
δ around
y. The circle C is the projection of the distortion sphere on
the x-y plane and point O is the origin. The dotted lines with
hollow arrowheads denote the lengths of various quantities.
otherwise we can strictly improve (i.e., strictly decrease)
the objective function value contradicting the optimality of
(t?1, t
?
2). Geometrically, this means that z
? must lie on the
circle of radius +
√
δ centered at y.
Finally, we observe that if z is feasible in (22), i.e., ‖y −
z‖2 ≤ δ, then so is z′ := ProjSpan(z)(y) = γz, where γ =
〈y,z〉
||z||2 . This is because the orthogonal projection of a vector
onto a subspace is the vector in the subspace closest to it so
that ||y − z′||2 ≤ ||y − z||2. Also observe that the value of
the objective function in (22) is the same for both z and γz
and that (y− z′) ⊥ z′. Thus, we may assume that there is an
optimal solution z? such that (y−z?) ⊥ z? for if not, we can
rescale z? suitably to ensure this property without affecting the
objective function or violating the distortion constraint. Since
(z?−y) = t?1 ıˆ+t?2 ˆ and y = ρıˆ+
√
1− ρ2ˆ, the orthogonality
condition (y − z?) ⊥ z? can be restated as
t?1(t
?
1 + ρ) + t
?
2(t
?
2 +
√
1− ρ2) = 0
which simplifies to
(t?1)
2 + (t?2)
2 + t?1ρ+ t
?
2
√
1− ρ2 = 0 (26)
Combining (26) with (25) we get
δ + t?1ρ+
√
(δ − (t?1)2)(1− ρ2) = 0.
This reduces to the following quadratic equation for t?1 with
two real roots
(t?1)
2 + 2δρt?1 + δ
2 − δ(1− ρ2) = 0
=⇒ t?1 = −δρ±
√
δ(1− δ)(1− ρ2).
We note that δ < 1 since we are considering the case δ <
ρ2 ≤ 1. Of the two real roots, t?1 = −δρ−
√
δ(1− δ)(1− ρ2)
has a lower objective value in (24). Using this value for t?1 and
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x
y
ρ
√
1− ρ2
O
C
z
√
δ(1−
δ)
−(x−ρy)√
1−ρ2
1
− δ
Fig. 11: Geometric interpretation of the solution to the problem
in (24) for the case when ρ > +
√
δ. Here, x,y are unit
length vectors with inner product equal to ρ. The unit vector
perpendicular y is given by −(x−ρy)/
√
1− ρ2. The circle C
is the projection of the feasible distortion sphere onto the x-y
plane. The problem in (24) can be stated as finding z within
the feasible distortion sphere which minimizes the cosine of
the angle between z and x. The optimum z lies on the tangent
from the origin O to the circle C on the far side of x. The
dotted lines with hollow arrowheads denote the lengths of
various quantities.
setting t?2 =
√
δ − (t?1)2, t?3 = 0, we can conclude that for the
case when δ < ρ2, the random variable
Z? := (1− δ)Y − (X − ρY )
√
δ(1− δ)
1− ρ2 (27)
attains the lower bound on the mutual information, i.e.,
I(X;Z) =
1
2
log
 1
1−
(√
ρ2(1− δ)−√(1− ρ2)δ)2
 .
(28)
We can interpret the solution geometrically as shown in
Figure 11. Unlike the previous case (0 ≤ ρ ≤ +√δ), here the
feasible distortion sphere does not allow z to be perpendicular
to x. However, one can see that the solution must lie on a
tangent from the origin to the distortion sphere. The optimum
z in this case (Eq. (27)) is the addition of two vectors, one
along y and the other perpendicular to y (the unit vector
along which is −(x−ρy)/
√
1− ρ2). The coefficients for the
linear combination can be inferred from the geometry of the
figure.
APPENDIX C
HANDLING SIDE INFORMATION ABOUT SENSITIVE X
If there is some side information U available about X ,
then certainly we cannot have less information leakage than
I(X;U). However if U is a noisy transformation of X inde-
pendent of the randomness used by the PPAN mechanism in
generating Z, we can still control any additional information
loss in the following manner. Using the properties of mutual
information, we have that
I(X;Z,U) = I(X;Z) + I(X;U |Z) ≤ I(X;Z) + I(X;U),
where the inequality above is true because Z and U are
independent given X . So while I(X;U) is already leaked,
we can prevent further leakage by minimizing I(X;Z).
APPENDIX D
MUTUAL INFORMATION UTILITY
While we focused on expected distortion to measure
(dis)utility, our framework can be adapted to other general
utility measures, for example, mutual information between
the useful information and the released data. The conditional
entropy h(Y |Z) is an alternative measure for distortion, which
corresponds to the utility objective of maximizing the mutual
information I(Y ;Z), since h(Y ) is fixed. When h(Y |Z)
is used as the distortion measure in a scenario where the
observation W = X , the privacy-utility tradeoff optimization
problem, as described in Section II-A, becomes equivalent
to the Information Bottleneck problem considered in [32]. In
other scenarios where the observation W = Y , this problem
becomes the Privacy Funnel problem introduced by [21]. The
formulation of (3) can be modified to address conditional
entropy distortion by introducing another variational posterior
QY |Z and using the following optimization, which applies a
second variational approximation of mutual information,
min
PZ|W ,QY |Z
max
QX|Z
E
[
logQX|Z(X|Z)
]− λE[ logQY |Z(Y |Z)],
where the expectations are with respect to (W,X, Y, Z) ∼
PW,X,Y PZ|W , and the parameter λ > 0 can be adjusted to
obtain various points along the optimal tradeoff curve. In a
similar fashion to the approach in Section II-B, this opti-
mization problem can be practically addressed via the training
of three neural networks, which respectively parameterize the
mechanism PZ|W and the two variational posteriors QX|Z and
QY |Z .
APPENDIX E
HANDLING VAGUELY-DEFINED SENSITIVE X
If the sensitive attribute is not well-defined, but there is an
available surrogate S for it such that the Markov chain
X ↔ S ↔ Z
holds then I(X;Z) ≤ I(S;Z) by the data processing inequal-
ity. Hence minimizing I(S;Z) still gives us protection for the
sensitive variable X . If such a Markov chain is not satisfied,
i.e., I(X;Z|S) 6= 0 but S is still a weak surrogate such that
I(X;Z|S) ≤  for some small  > 0, then since
I(Z;X) ≤ I(Z;X,S) = I(Z;S)+I(Z;X|S) ≤ I(Z;S)+,
minimizing I(Z;S) still gives us some protection for X .
Alternatively, if we cannot specify what attribute in the
dataset W is sensitive, we can still train PPAN by setting the
sensitive attribute X = W , i.e., all attributes are regarded as
sensitive. PPAN will then try to minimize information leakage
for all attributes, while subject to the allowed distortion budget
with respect to the useful attribute Y .
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APPENDIX F
SAMPLING FROM A GAUSSIAN MIXTURE MODEL (GMM)
The technique of sampling from a multivariate Gaussian de-
scribed in Section II-C2 can be extended to GMMs as follows.
The release mechanism can be realized with a neural network
fθ that produces the set of parameters {(µl,i,Al,i, pil,i)}ml=1 =
fθ(wi), where pil,i are the mixture weights. We then sample
zl,i = Al,iul,i + µl,i for each component distribution of the
GMM, and compute the loss terms via
LiGMM(θ, φ) :=
m∑
l=1
pil,i
(
logQφ(xi|zl,i) + λd(yi, zl,i)
)
, (29)
which combines the Gaussian sampling reparameterization
trick with a direct expectation over the mixture component
selection.
APPENDIX G
THEORETICALLY OPTIMAL PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADEOFFS
FOR SYMMETRIC PAIR DISTRIBUTION
The mutual information of the symmetric pair distribution
(see (7)) is given by [34] as
I(X;Y ) = logm− p log(m− 1)− h2(p) =: rm(p),
where h2(p) := −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p) is the binary
entropy function, and for convenience in later discussion, we
define rm(p) as a function of the distribution parameters m
and p.
For sensitive and useful attributes jointly distributed ac-
cording to the symmetric pair distribution, the theoretically
optimal privacy-utility tradeoffs, as defined by (1), are ana-
lytically derived in [34] for several data observation models,
while using probability of error as the distortion metric, i.e.,
E[1(Y 6= Z)] = Pr[Y 6= Z]. In one case, when the observa-
tion is the full data, i.e., W = (X,Y ), the optimal mutual
information privacy-leakage as a function of the distortion
(probability of error) limit δ ∈ [0, 1] is given by
I∗W=(X,Y )(δ) =

rm(p+ δ), if δ ≤ 1− 1m − p,
rm(p− δ), if δ ≤ p− (1− 1m ),
0, otherwise.
(30)
In another case, when the observation is only the useful
attribute, i.e., W = Y , the optimal privacy-leakage as a
function δ ∈ [0, 1] is given by
I∗W=Y (δ) =
{
rm
(
p+ δ
(
1− pmm−1
))
, if δ < 1− 1m ,
0, otherwise.
(31)
APPENDIX H
SCATTER PLOTS OF MULTIVARIATE GAUSSIAN DATA
We visualize the output of the trained PPAN mechanism of
Section III-B4 for a particular value of mean squared error.
As shown in Figure 6, the operating points of the PPAN
mechanism for various values of distortion δ is close to the
theoretically optimal privacy-utility tradeoff. We focus on the
PPAN mechanism trained corresponding to the operating point
of (I(X;Z),E‖Y − Z‖2) = (1.838, 0.230). Recall that the
sensitive X , useful Y (which is the same as the input W
to PPAN in the output perturbation observation model) and
the released Z are all vectors in R5. The distortion between
Y and Z is measured as their component-wise squared error.
The test set consists of 4000 (X,Y ) pairs, and we obtain 4000
realizations of Z corresponding to the test set at the output of
the trained PPAN. In Figure 12, we show a scatter plot of
three components of the test set and release for the chosen
operating point. The three panels, each showing a particular
component, illustrate the nature of noise added by PPAN in
three different scenarios of high, medium and low correlation
between the sensitive Xi and useful Yi. It can be seen that
when the sensitive and useful variables are highly correlated,
PPAN adds a significant amount of noise to obtain the release.
On the other hand, when the correlation is low, PPAN adds
very little noise and releases the useful Yi as is. The behavior
for medium correlation is between the two extremes.
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Fig. 12: Scatter plot of 3 components of 4000 test data points as input to a PPAN mechanism trained for δ = 0.23. The
simulated data model is described in Section III-B4. The black points are (Yi, Xi) test data component pairs and the blue
points are (Yi, Zi) pairs corresponding to the release generated by PPAN. The red line is a least squares fit of Zi v.s. Yi in
each case. On components where Corr(Xi, Yi) is higher, PPAN mechanism allows higher levels of distortion, i.e., (Yi −Zi)2.
In addition to the different slope, the variance of the noise added in the three cases is also different.
